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Pursuant to Rule 24 (c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant files 
this Reply Brief containing answers to any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. 
Due to the recent renumbering of Title 41 chapter 6 and adoption of chapter 6(a), 
the following table may be helpful to the court in being able to follow and understand 
some of the citations that may have inadvertently been used by both the Appellant and 
Appellee in their briefs. It should be noted that at the time of the alleged offense, the 
2003 version of the statutes was controlling. 
Statute 
Standards and 
specifications for 
uniform system of 
traffic-control 
devices and school 
1 crossing guards 
i Placing and 
maintenance on 
state highways -
Restrictions on local 
authorities. 
Obeying devices -
Effect of improper 
position, illegibility, 
or absence -
Presumption of 
lawful placement 
and compliance 
with chapter. 
Roadway divided 
into marked lanes -
Provisions -Traffic-
control devices 
Definitions-
"Official traffic-
control device" 
(2003) 
§41-6-20 
§41-6-22 
§41-6-23 
§41-6-61 
§41-6-1(26) 
Renumbered (2005) 
§41-6a-301 
§41-6a-302 
§41-6a-304 
§41-6a-710 
§41-6a-102(62) 
Changes 
Essentially unchanged 
except for references to 
other sections renumbered 
2005 removes "Manual on 
Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices (MUTCD)" by 
specific reference, but 
incorporates the manual by 
reference to another 
section. 
Essentially unchanged 
except to add references to 
other sections defining the 
terms "peace officer or 
other authorized 
personnel." 
Essentially unchanged 
except for references to 
other sections renumbered 
and paragraph (3) divided 
into parts (a) and (b). 
Essentially unchanged 
except the word "Official" is 
removed from the definition | 
in 2005 version. | 
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ARGUMENT 
1. In Appellee's brief, Appellee's points 1-3 argue for finding of an infraction under a 
traffic code violation as only existing in a vacuum which is devoid of any other 
controlling law. However, in determining an infraction or violation of a motor vehicle 
traffic code section, many characteristics of substantive criminal law still apply, which 
require an analysis of both the conduct plus the attendant circumstances. Element 
construction for the violation, by its very nature, requires a reading of the statute 
specified by police officer's citation and all the pertinent paragraphs within the same 
chapter and title. 
Inconsistent or misplaced traffic control devices which are in conflict with each 
other should not be the basis for citing a driver with an infraction. To do so would be 
akin to using a "right turn only" and a "no right turn" sign as a basis for citing the driver 
for either or both; a "parking" and a "no parking" sign for the same parking place; or a 
"25 limit" miles per hour and a "55 limit" covering the same stretch of road. 
As shown by his listing of Determinative Statutory Provisions, Appellee in his 
brief seeks an extremely narrow construction of what constitutes a traffic violation, 
Appellee's brief at 2-3. Appellee cites only the paragraphs of code sections which set 
forth the offense, but would prefer to have the court view the violations in a vacuum. For 
example, Appellee cited only the lawful placement provisions (3>(4) of § 41-6-23, the 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
section. However, paragraph (2)(a) of the same statute might also interest this court in 
making its determination and analyzing the meaning of the statute: 
"Obeying devices - Effect of improper position, illegibility, or absence -
Presumption of lawful placement and compliance with chapter... 
(2) (a) Any provision of this chapter, for which official traffic-control 
devices are required, may not be enforced against an alleged violator if at 
the time and place of the alleged violation an official device is not in 
proper position and sufficiently legible to be seen by an ordinarily 
observant person." 
Competent evidence was presented (marshaled) in the court room showing that 
nearly all drivers encountering the same intersection in question and with the same 
signage in question, made the same choices as the Defendant: i.e. the "hook ramp" 
seemed to be the proper route according to the signage to enter University Parkway, 
Westbound. Other competent statistical evidence which was presented or inherently 
made available to the court at trial showed that more traffic tickets were given at the 
particular location in question for the same or similar infraction during the few months 
with the arguably faulty signage than any other location in the entire municipality. See 
4th District Court - OREM Traffic Report Index Print-Out Filing Dates 06/01/2004 -
12/01/2004. "These ordinarily observant drivers, like the Defendant, if given proper 
direction, would not have entered the hookramp and would not have been faced with the 
necessity of choosing the least dangerous action to overcome the perilous situation in 
which they had been placed by the faulty signage." Appellants Brief pg 21. 
When reading all the pertinent statutes together, there could be no infraction of a 
statute requiring drivers to follow traffic control devices when those same traffic control 
5 
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devices are in conflict with each other. The trial court failed to consider the attendant 
circumstances leading up to the Dafendaiit crossing the double white line or the necessity 
defense inherent to the dangerous situation created by the faulty traffic signage. 
The trial court transcripts illustrated the difficulty the Pro Se Defendant had in 
trying to bring forth evidence of faulty signage. He was trying to bring forth evidence 
obtained in personal meetings and phone conversations with UDOT (Utah Department of 
Transportation). Orem v. Martineau, Trial No. 045208157 pg 27-33, Official transcript 
ofhearingXlO-18-2004). Even though the meetings and phone conversations were 
properly denied entry as hearsay, the record will also show that the Utah Department of 
Transportation did consider the signage improper because it became a matter of the court 
record that the signage was changed. The changing of the signage was not testimony 
subject to the hearsay objection, but admissible (even if as subsequent remedial action) 
because the changing of the signage by UDOT was not in any effort of settlement or 
motivation other than to address the safety concerns of the faulty signage that failed to 
alert drivers as to how to properly proceed at the intersection in question. 
CONCLUSION 
In analyzing the competent evidence that was brought fourth and established at the 
trial court: 
1. Changing lanes in less than three seconds or crossing a single solid white 
line are not infractions found anywhere in the traffic code, but were 
considered by the court in its finding and ruling. And the judge did rely on 
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those calculations and findings to improperly overcome whatever evidence 
of ambiguity in the signage was marshaled by the Defendant. 
Whichever location of the nearly 900 foot area of double white line defined 
as a "Gore" area by statute was crossed by the defendant on the day in 
question, it was only done as necessitated by the attendant circumstances. 
Attendant circumstances are proper in the analysis of a traffic infraction and 
were improperly ignored or rejected by the court. 
Statistical evidence of what constituted an ordinarily observant driver (and 
how those drivers obeyed the traffic signs) was presented at trial and should 
have been found proper in the analysis on the issue of whether or not the 
signs and markings were ambiguous or in conflict. The statistical evidence 
was improperly ignored or rejected by the court. 
In determining the meanings given to traffic control devices: "markings are 
used to supplement other traffic control devices such as signs, signals and 
other markings." Section lA.QlFederal Highway Commission, fyfanual on 
Uniform Traffic Control Devices(MUTCD), 2003 Edition with Revision 
No. 1 Incorporated, effective July 21,2004. 
An "ambiguity" defense for improperly placed or absent signage has legal 
support when statutes are not read in a vacuum. 
a. That "ambiguity" defense was properly and factually supported at 
trial. 
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b. A guilty verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence. 
Crossing of a double white line was not in violation of U.C.A. 41-6-
61 (a statute typically used to cite a driver for weaving in an out of a 
lane of traffic) when the crossing was necessitated by other attendant 
circumstances. 
c. To find the 41-6-61 statute applying to a "gore" area, when the 
statute does not mention a "gore" area, and another statute, 41-6-
63.30 does mention a "gore," was a mistake in law and subject to a 
review de novo by the court of appeals when the trial court 
attempted to put the two statutes together to form its own violation. 
7 ^ day of OcMkr Date this / ' day of L/UMztr 2005 
BY: /^p2*PVZ&&^M*JMJ**J 
!tmes L. Driessen 
Attorney for Appellant (Defendant) 
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